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Abstract
Many weighing functions are currently in use for evaluating quotes in multidimensional procurement. 
Although these may affect the price paid by the buyer, their design has been little informed by empiri-
cal considerations. This paper studies the impacts of weight values, scoring rules, and abnormally low 
tenders criteria (ALTC) in an original sample of procurements of services. The panel dimension of the 
data and the rich set of procurement characteristics are exploited to show that convex price scoring 
rules (PSRs) and increases in the weight for price yield lower prices, whereas independent/interdepend-
ent PSRs and different ALTC result in the same price.
Keywords: Multidimensional procurement, weighing function, scoring rule, abnormally low tenders cri-
terion, Spanish Armed Forces.
JEL Classification: H57
1.  Introduction
Procurement often involves considerations other than price. Aspects of the good to be 
procured such as design, delivery time, technical characteristics, or the guarantee’s term may 
affect the value of the procurement outcome. Procurement including non-monetary dimen-
sions (quality for brevity) in addition to price has been called multidimensional (McAfee and 
McMillan, 1987), multi-attribute (Staschus et al., 1991), or best value (Peckinpaugh and 
Goldstein, 1992). As argued by Dini, Pacini, and Valletti (2006), in multidimensional pro-
curement it is unlikely that the same bidder offers both the cheapest price and the highest 
quality, as high-quality products are typically more costly to produce (although see Albano, 
Dini and Zampino, 2009). Hence, an essential element of multidimensional procurement is 
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a method for combining a quote’s price and quality dimensions into a total score. Further-
more, as price and quality are rarely observed in the same units, they must be transformed 
into commensurate scales before being combined into a total score (Bergman and Lundberg, 
2013; Wang and Liu, 2014; Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2015).
A function that transforms a value measured on one scale (price or quality) into a meas-
ure on another scale (price score or quality score) is a scoring rule, whereas a function that 
combines price and quality scores into a single overall value is a weighing function (WF) 
(Bergman and Lundberg, 2013)1. This definition is a bit unconventional as functions that 
map a multidimensional offer into a single total value are usually called scoring rules in the 
theoretical literature on multidimensional bidding (see references below). However, it agrees 
to the purpose of this paper to distinguish between assigning a score to each individual com-
ponent of a quote and combining these scores into a single overall value.
The 2004 EU’s public procurement directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, which were 
operating in Spain over the period covered by this analysis, included provisions to ensure 
that the award of public contracts complied with the principles of transparency, non-discrim-
ination, and equal treatment. One of these provisions required contracting agencies to indi-
cate the criterion to be used for award of the contract (either lowest price or most economi-
cally advantageous tender: MEAT) in the procurement’s contract notice2, as well as the 
criteria representing the MEAT and their weighing. The systematic registering of these fea-
tures has contributed to advancing research on different aspects of multidimensional pro-
curement.
The first generation of theoretical studies on multidimensional procurement (Che, 1993; 
Branco, 1997; David, Azoulay-Schwartz and Kraus, 2006; Asker and Cantillon, 2008 and 
2010 and Nishimura, 2015) used the quasilinear WF that is linear in the price bid for select-
ing the winning firm. However, the transformations of the price bid exerted by certain price 
scoring rules (PSRs) used in many countries worldwide result in non-quasilinear WFs 
(Hanazono, Nakabayashi and Tsuruoka, 2015 and Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2016). Hence, 
recent theoretical analyses of multidimensional procurement have attempted to relax the 
quasilinear restriction in the WF (Wang and Liu, 2014; Hanazono, Nakabayashi and Tsu-
ruoka, 2015; Dastidar, 2016 and Nakabayashi and Hirose, 2016). But despite the increased 
realism of theoretical models, the empirical work on the extent to which multidimensional 
bidding can be influenced by contracting authorities has been hindered by the difficulties of 
obtaining appropriate data (Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2016).
Another strand of literature developed around the application of WFs in real procure-
ment. Dini, Pacini and Valletti (2006) provide buyers with practical advice for choosing 
between some widely adopted types of PSRs. Chen (2008) and Bergman and Lundberg 
(2013) apply economic principles to discuss the pros and cons of several supplier selection 
methods. Dimitri (2013) focuses on the issue of translating a buyer’s preferences into WFs. 
And Nishimura (2015) elucidates conditions under which the buyer’s optimal WF can be 
additively separable in quality attributes. All these papers take more of a theoretical approach 
than we do here.
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The empirical literature on multidimensional procurement includes comparisons of 
quality scores induced by different types of PSRs (Albano, Dini and Zampino, 2009), of 
winning bids delivered by rigid/flexible evaluation systems (Cameron, 2000) and by lowest 
price/MEAT awarding mechanisms (Lundberg, 2006; Lewis and Bajari, 2011), of price bids 
resulting from varying price weights (Iimi, 2013; Koning and van de Meerendonk, 2014), 
and of bidding competitiveness as influenced by price weights, PSRs, and abnormally low 
tenders criteria (ALTC) (Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2016)3.  But with the exception of Koning 
and van de Meerendonk (2014), who also provide some evidence on the effect of price 
weights on the winning bid, and Ballesteros-Pérez et al. (2016), not many authors have 
looked into the practical effects that characteristics of the WF such as the price weight, the 
PSR, and the ALTC criterion exert on the winning bid, that is, on the price paid by the buyer.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to filling this gap by exploring the magnitudes 
of these effects in an original sample of multidimensional procurements of services con-
ducted by the Spanish Armed Forces (SAF) between 2012 and 2016. Evidence on the extent 
to which the price paid by the buyer (and, by extension, the level of bidder competitiveness) 
is affected by characteristics of the WF will help contracting authorities design WFs for 
practical application in multidimensional procurement, making this design a less intuitive 
and subjective process.
A limitation of this study is that the econometric model does not include information on 
the specific non-monetary dimensions set out in the contract nor on the contractors’ actual 
performance, but rather some controls for ex ante quality of service (Domberger, Hall, and Li 
1995) and a measure of bid screening intensity by the contract awarding committee (Decarolis 
2014). Although differences in non-monetary dimensions across contracts may be reflected in 
the price paid, finding a set of non-monetary dimensions common to all (or most) contracts in 
a sample of heterogeneous contracts is non-trivial. As to the risk of poor performance by con-
tractors, to the extent that the controls included in the model are, as a matter of fact, insufficient 
to account for this risk, our estimates would tend to understate the true magnitude of the price 
paid. (Note, however, that the evidence on the effect of competition on performance is not 
conclusive: Domberger, Hall, and Li 1995, Cameron 2000, and Decarolis 2014.)
The empirical analyses of Lewis and Bajari (2011) and Nakabayashi and Hirose (2016) 
are based on the structural methodology. In contrast, this paper focuses on estimating the net 
effect of covariates on the winning bid, which precludes forecasting the effects of regime 
shifts that are not reflected in the data. Thus, for example, the results of this paper cannot be 
used to predict the impact on the price paid of a change in certain competition rules (e.g., an 
increase in the financial guarantee to be given by the contractor), or a change in market 
structure that goes beyond a variation in the number of bidders. Nevertheless, we provide 
evidence on economically advantageous determinants of the price paid, all of which are 
amenable to policy change.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on 
public procurement in Spain over the period covered by this analysis and introduces the 
components of WFs. Section 3, which is structured into three subsections, deals with the 
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selection of the sample, the construction of the variables representing the PSRs and ALTC 
identified in the sample, and the definition of the explaining and control variables. Section 4 
describes the econometric framework and Section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 
6 concludes.
2.  Public procurement in Spain under the 2011 law
From December 16, 2011, to March 8, 2018, procurement by the Spanish government 
(including the armed forces) took place under Royal Legislative Decree 2011/3. During the 
lifetime of this law, and after receiving authorization to procure, the procurement process 
began with a contracting agency (CA) estimating the contracting dossier value, calculated as 
the estimated cost of the service (work or supply) to be procured net of VAT, plus the cost of 
possible options and renewals and possible bonuses paid to bidders. The estimated cost 
(which is often called the reserve price in the procurement literature: e.g., see Dimitri, Piga, 
and Spagnolo 2006) was intended to reflect the general market price of the service, and in-
dicated to the interested providers the maximum acceptable price for the agency (excluding 
options, renewals, and bonuses). Often, the estimated cost was the result of a market-research 
study, but, when available, a previous estimated cost (possibly corrected for inflation or sec-
toral wage changes) could also be utilized.
Whenever a contracting dossier for a service was valued at €18,000 or more, it had to be 
purchased ordinarily by a procurement process open to any interested provider4.  The win-
ning bidder was determined by means of a sealed-bid auction in which one of two different 
award criteria could be employed: lowest cost or MEAT. MEAT was used whenever the 
procurement involved dimensions in addition to price, and it implied that each individual 
dimension of a quote would be evaluated and assigned a score, and the contract would be 
awarded to the supplier who submitted the quote with the highest total score according to a 
pre-specified WF.
WFs can be formulated generally as (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2015):
 Oi = {Wp . Si + Wq . Qi} ai (1)
where Oi  is bidder i’s total score, Wp and Wq  are price and quality weights satisfying Wp + Wq 
= 1, Si and Qi are bidder i’s price and quality scores calculated with the PSR and quality scor-
ing rule given in the procurement specifications, and ai is an abnormality indicator (defined 
below). The bidder with the highest total score was the bidder offering the MEAT (or best value 
for money). In case of a tie, the bidder with the largest proportion of disabled workers, or with 
the highest score in the dimension with the highest weight, was generally chosen.
In cases where it was possible to provide the service to be procured separately but it still 
constituted a functional unit (e.g. the maintenance of buildings located at distant military 
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bases), the whole contracting dossier could be divided into batches. Providing that the whole 
dossier was valued at €18,000 or more, each batch had to be purchased ordinarily by pro-
curement of the types described above even if the estimated cost for a batch was lower than 
€18,000.
Several provisions of the 2011 law were aimed at eliciting unbiased bids and limiting the 
risk of poor performance by contractors. One of these provisions was the possibility of re-
quiring the winning bidder to prove the price that it offered if that price was below the eco-
nomic threshold defined by the ALT criterion used in the auction. In the event that its expla-
nations were deemed unreliable by the contract awarding committee, the winning bidder 
would be disqualified (ai = 0 in expression (1)) and typically the second best bidder would 
win. (If the price offered was not lower than the economic threshold or the explanations were 
deemed reliable, then ai = 1).
The bid-envelopes received were opened and examined at a public event. The awardee 
could be awarded a contract for at most 4 years, although contracts for services were typi-
cally of much shorter duration. With some exceptions (such as when security or public 
safety could be jeopardized) the identity and bid of the winning bidder were published in the 
contract results notice.
3.  Data and variables
3.1. Data
The analysis is conducted using 477 multidimensional procurements of support services 
pertaining to 218 contracting dossiers undertook by the SAF in the period 2012-20165.  The 
contract notices for these dossiers were published between January 1, 2012 and December 
31, 2016, and procurements were awarded before June 15, 2017. This limit on the awarding 
date may have excluded very few of the procurement procedures started in the last months 
of 2016, as 90 percent of the procurements of services are awarded within 143 days.
The 218 contracting dossiers included in this study represent 29.5 percent of the 739 
service contracting dossiers awarded through competitive bidding by the SAF in the period 
2012-2016. The rest of the dossiers were discarded for several reasons. In 321 cases the price 
paid by the government had to equal the estimated cost, either because this cost represented 
a commitment of funds to pay the contractor’s invoices or to subsidize the price of a service, 
or because the dossiers involved special administrative contracts, which entail no cost for the 
government as the service is paid for by the end user. A further 43 dossiers were dropped on 
the grounds that they were canceled before awarding, 34 for having incomplete or inconsist-
ent data, 114 for being awarded using the lowest cost criterion, and 9 for being null and void. 
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The data on the sample of procurements was compiled from the information stored in 
the Public Sector Contracting Platform (PLACE in Spanish), which is the national advertis-
ing website for Spanish government agencies to post contract notices, legal and technical 
auction information sheets, and contract results. These documents were personally read by 
the author and the information obtained was stored as a set of variables whose definition is 
outlined below. These variables contain detailed information on the procurement specifica-
tions and the winning bid. Information on all the bids for a procurement was published for 
about 20 percent of the procurements only.
3.2.  Price scoring rules and abnormally low tenders criteria in service procurements 
conducted by the Spanish Armed Forces
The PSR and ALT mechanism used in each procurement were taken from the legal auc-
tion information sheet. For the sake of implementation in the econometric analysis, the vari-
ety of PSRs and ALTC identified in the sample were classified as explained in the following 
paragraphs.
Table 2 presents the mathematical expressions in per-unit values for the 16 PSRs identi-
fied in the sample, formulated following for the most part the notation employed by Balles-
teros-Pérez et al. (2015). To assign a price score Si to a bidder’s price bid (bi), i=1,...,n , these 
PSRs make use of the estimated cost of the contract (A) and/or of certain statistics calculated 
from the final distribution of price bids, such as order statistics (b(1) < ... < b(n)), the lowest 
bid (bmin ≡ b(1)), the highest bid (bmax ≡ b(n)), and the average bid (bm)
6.  Table 2 also shows 
the mathematical expressions for the PSRs in terms of per-unit discounts, rebates, or drops 
off A (di), as bidder i’s price bid can be expressed equivalently as:




The maximum discount (dmax) corresponds to bmin, and the average discount (dm) cor-
responds to the average of all price bids expressed in discounts submitted. The PSRs num-
bered 1, 3, 4, 9, and 10 in column (1) of Table 2 can also be found (in some cases, with a 
slight modification) among the 124 Spanish construction auctions analyzed by Ballesteros-
Pérez et al. (2016).
The PSRs numbered 6, 8, 9, 12, and 16 are such that Si only depends on A and bi, so that 
each bidder can calculate its price score in advance (i.e., before the bidding phase takes 
place). This type of PSR is called independent by Albano, Dini, and Zampino (2009). The 
other PSRs listed in Table 2 are of the interdependent type, as the price score of any bidder 
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Table 2 
PRICE SCORING RULES IDENTIFIED IN THE SAMPLE
ID Obs Description in terms of price bid (bi) Description in terms of price discount (di) Independence Shape
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 281 Interdependent Convex
2 1 Interdependent Lineara
3 68 Interdependent Linear
4 3 Interdependent Linear
5 27 Interdependent Linear
6 1 Independent Linear
7 1 Interdependent Linear
8 11 Independent Concave
9 70 Independent Linear
10 2 Interdependent Linear
11 2 Interdependent Linear
12 1 Independent Concave
13 1 Interdependent Convex
14 2 Interdependent Concave
15 5 Interdependent Linear
16 1 Independent Concave
TABLE 2. PRICE SCORING RULES IDENTIFIED IN THE SAMPLE
Notes: a: Deemed as linear since the falls in Si are of equal size. bt and dt are reference values calculated as a percentage of A and as a drop off A, respectively.
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11 12  if 1 1 1 1.05
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3 4  if 1.10 1 1 1.15
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3 5  if 1
4 5  if 1 .97
9 10  if .97 .95
1 if .95 .93
9 10  if .93 .90
7 10  if .90 .88
3 5  if .88 .85
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(Continued)
ID Obs Description in terms of price bid (bi) Description in terms of price discount (di) Independence Shape
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 281 Interdependent Convex
2 1 Interdependent Lineara
3 68 Interdependent Linear
4 3 Interdependent Linear
5 27 Interdependent Linear
6 1 Independent Linear
7 1 Interdependent Linear
8 11 Independent Concave
9 70 Independent Linear
10 2 Interdependent Linear
11 2 Interdependent Linear
12 1 Independent Concave
13 1 Interdependent Convex
14 2 Interdependent Concave
15 5 Interdependent Linear
16 1 Independent Concave
TABLE 2. PRICE SCORING RULES IDENTIFIED IN THE SAMPLE
Notes: a: Deemed as linear since the falls in Si are of equal size. bt and dt are reference values calculated as a percentage of A and as a drop off A, respectively.
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also depends on the other bidders’ price offers and hence cannot be calculated in advance. 
At stake is which of these two types of PSRs induces more aggressive bidding and thus low-
ers the price paid for the service. For Dini, Pacini, and Valletti (2006), interdependent PSRs 
give stronger incentives on price competition as participants, by bidding low, increase the 
likelihood to get the highest score reducing at the same time the score obtained by all other 
competitors. On the other hand, Albano, Dini, and Zampino (2009) argue that independent 
PSRs stimulate price competition as a supplier can calculate in advance the change in its 
score associated to a variation in the offered price. This issue is explored in the sample using 
the dummy variable PSR_indep, which indicates that the PSR is of the independent type. 
This occurs in 17.6 percent of the sample.
PSRs can also be classified attending to the shape of their gradient, i.e. to the sign of 
their second derivate with respect to bi (Dini, Pacini, and Valletti 2006, Ballesteros-Pérez et 
al. 2015). A linear PSR is such that, as bi decreases, Si increases at a constant rate. But in a 
convex (respectively, concave) PSR, Si increases at an increasing (decreasing) rate as bi de-
creases, thus giving stronger (milder) rewards to high discounts and progressively favoring 
bidding on price (quality). Figure 1 depicts an example of each type. It is expected that, ce-
teris paribus, convex PSRs may lower the price paid for the service. This conjecture is inves-
tigated in the sample with the dummy variable PSR_convex, which indicates that the PSR is 
of the convex type. This occurs in 59.1 percent of the sample. Since only 15 procurements 
used a concave PSR, this type has been aggregated with the linear type7. 
ALTC set a threshold price bid (babn) or discount (dabn) such that a price bid that fulfils 
the condition bi < babn or, equivalently, di > dabn, will be disqualified unless the bidder can 
64
Figure 1: Linear, convex and concave price scoring
Notes: The figure depicts an example of three types of price scoring rules identified in the sample: linear (  
represented with a solid line), convex ( , dashed line), and concave ( , dotted line).
prove the price that it offered. Two types of ALTC can be identified in the sample attending 
to their independence from the final distribution of bids. The type of independent ALTC may 
be expressed generally as:
 babn = (1 – d)A (4)
or
 dabn = d, (5)
where the parameter d ranges between 0.10 and 1.00 (i.e. no threshold price bid) in the sam-
ple. Independent ALTC allow the economic threshold to be known in advance, so that bid-
ders are certain about the bid below which they will be requested to prove the price that they 
offered.
Interdependent ALTC are such that the economic threshold cannot be known in advance. 
Interdependent ALTC are given in two basic forms. There are those that are a function of the 
average of the price bids submitted:
 babn = (1 – e)bm, (6)
or, equivalently,
 dabn = 1 –(1 – e)(1 – dm),  (7)
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where the parameter e ranges between 0.10 and 0.30 in the sample. There are also those 
whose expression depends on both the number of bidders (n) and bm, as in
8: 
 babn = (1 – .25)A   if n = 1 (8)
 babn = (1 – .20)bmax   if n = 2  (9)
 babn = max ((1 – .10)bm, (1 – .25)A)   if n = 3  (10)
 babn = (1 – .10)bm   if n ≥ 4  (11)
or, equivalently,
 dabn = .25   if n = 1  (12)
 dabn = 1– (1 – .20)(1 – dmin)   if n = 2.  (13)
 dabn = min(1– (1 – .10)(1 – dm), .25)   if n = 3  (14)
 dabn = 1– (1 – .10)(1 – dm)   if n ≥ 4.  (15)
While it might seem that the threshold defined in (6) is unrelated to n, the optimal price 
strategy in multidimensional bidding is a function of n (e.g., see Che 1993, David, Azoulay-
Schwartz, and Kraus 2006, and Nakabayashi and Hirose 2016), so that when forming an 
expectation of bm a rational bidder will have a belief about n. Hence, both basic forms may 
be grouped into a common type of ALTC. The ALTC in expressions (4) and (6) are among 
the six generic ALTC identified by Ballesteros-Pérez et al. (2015) in construction auctions 
worldwide.
Engel et al. (2006) have argued that interdependent ALTC will lead firms to bid higher 
so as to avoid the risk of exclusion, whereas Ballesteros-Pérez et al. (2015) have found that, 
when competing under independent ALTC, most bidders place their bids just before crossing 
the economic threshold, so as to avoid losing as much economic score as possible despite 
giving up some profits. These results seem to suggest that the price paid by the buyer might 
be higher under interdependent ALTC, but investigating this conjecture in the data requires 
controlling for differences in economic thresholds between ALTC. Unfortunately, this is not 
possible with the data at hand. Although d and e can be observed whenever the ALT crite-
rion is of the type (4) or (6) (as it occurs in 18.9 and 30.4 percent of the sample, respec-
tively), these parameters are not commensurate as they have different origins. Furthermore, 
the precise economic threshold that bidders may have taken into account in ALTC of the 
types (6) and (8)-(11) is not known.
For these reasons, the estimating model will allow for price differences among three 
groups of ALTC: those given by expressions (4), (6), and (8)-(11). The type of interdepend-
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ent ALTC is split into two groups to account for possible differences in economic thresholds 
between them. The groups represented by (6) and (8)-(11) will be indicated with the dummy 
variables ALTC_g2 and ALTC_g3, respectively. The estimates on these dummies measure 
not only the difference in price paid caused by the existence of different economic thresholds 
between groups of ALTC, but also the difference relative to the situation where bidders know 
the threshold in advance.
3.3. Other variables
The explaining variable is the natural logarithm of the price paid for the service. In the 
sample, prices for the contracts totaled €170.2 million, ranged between €997 and €5.3 mil-
lion, and averaged €356,867. The main explanatory variables are the percentage weight 
given to price in the WF and the characteristics of the PSR and ALT criterion highlighted in 
the previous section. The regressions also include a quadratic function of the natural loga-
rithm of the estimated cost9,  the contract term measured in months, an indicator for urgent 
procurement, an indicator for whether bidders must give a provisional guarantee, an indica-
tor for whether the contract allows for extra payments, a measure of bid screening intensity 
by the contract awarding committee, service-type fixed effects, the procurement’s vintage as 
represented by year dummies, and, for a subsample of 356 procurements, a quadratic func-
tion of n. A detailed definition of these variables plus some descriptive statistics are given in 
Table 3.
Table 3 















Percentage weight given to price in the award criteria, divided by 
10.
6.19 (1.61) 6.34 (1.52)
PSR_
indep
Dummy variable = 1 if bidders can calculate their price score be-




Dummy variable = 1 if the second derivate of the PSR with res-
pect to the price bid is strictly positive.
0.59 0.63
ALTC_g1








Dummy variable = 1 if the ALT criterion is a function of the num-
ber of bidders and the average price bid.
0.51 0.58



















Measured in months and exclusive of possible extensions.
10.51 (8.53) 11.06 (9.09)




Dummy variable = 1 if bidders must guarantee that the quotes 
submitted will be maintained until the contract is awarded. 0.10 0.08
Price 
amend
Dummy variable = 1 if the contract price could be altered for rea-
sons stated in the contract.
0.30 0.36
Screening
Difference (in weeks) between when the bids were opened by the 
awarding committee and when the identity of the winning bidder 
was announced.






Dummy variable = 1 if the contract was for repair or maintenance 





Dummy variable = 1 if the contract was for repair or maintenance 
of building installations. 0.12 0.10
Hotel/Res-
taurant
Dummy variable =1 if the contract was for hotel, accommodation, 





Dummy variable =1 if the contract was for transportation, tele-
communications, or training services. 0.13 0.13
Refuse





Dummy variable =1 if the contract was for other services.
0.14 0.14
Year 2012 Dummy variable = 1 if the contract notice was published in 2012. 0.19 0.08
Year 2013 Dummy variable = 1 if the contract notice was published in 2013. 0.24 0.21
Year 2014 Dummy variable = 1 if the contract notice was published in 2014. 0.17 0.18
Year 2015 Dummy variable = 1 if the contract notice was published in 2015. 0.18 0.24
Year 2016 Dummy variable = 1 if the contract notice was published in 2016. 0.22 0.29
No. of 
bidders
Includes price bids above the estimated cost, presenting formal 
errors, or deemed abnormally low.
3.04 
(2.83)
Notes: Author’s calculations based on data compiled from the Spanish Public Sector Contracting Platform.
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When procurement is deemed urgent, the period for sending bids is reduced from 15 
days to just 8 days, which might induce the participation of fewer bidders and/or less intense 
bidding between participants, resulting in higher prices. A provisional guarantee (typically, 
3 percent of the price bid) is intended to ensure that the quotes submitted will be maintained 
until the contract is awarded, so that quality reduction during the period between when the 
bids are submitted and when the contract is awarded is discouraged. As argued by Decarolis 
(2014), it is conceivable that an increase in the time taken to award the contract by the award-
ing committee comes with the benefit of selecting a more reliable contractor, but also at the 
expense of increasing the price paid. In the same vein, cost overruns were generally not al-
lowed by the 2011 law except for reasons stated in the contract itself. In these cases, the 
prospect of extra payments might induce more aggressive bidding at the time of contracting 
and therefore lower prices (Goldberg 1977).
For a subsample of 356 procurements, the information stored in PLACE includes the 
number of bidders, i.e. the number of firms who submitted a quote. A firm may be a joint 
venture (Unión Temporal de Empresas), in whose case the companies that form the joint 
venture cannot submit offers individually. Firms who belong to the same group (which oc-
curs when one company controls, directly or indirectly, the other/s) may submit offers indi-
vidually, but only the group’s lowest bid is used for calculating bm in ALTC. Apparently, the 
information on n was missed exogenously, as (the log of) the price paid is redundant in a 
probit model for the observability of n, and the average number of bidders (3.0) closely re-
sembles that observed in other samples of government service procurements (e.g. see Li and 
Zheng 2009). The quadratic specification allows the possibility of a varying empirical effect 
of n on the price paid.
4.  Econometric model
The empirical strategy followed in this paper is to specify, estimate, and test a regression 
model for the natural logarithm of the price paid for the service (denoted by ln y) on the set 
of explanatory variables (x). The cancellation/completion outcome of a procurement is not 
analyzed due to the small number of canceled procurements in the sample (only 26 procure-
ments were declared null and void).
Variable ln y for procurement k conducted by CA j is modeled as
 ln yjk = b0 + xjk ß + cj + ujk, (16)
where ujk is an idiosyncratic error term satisfying
 E(ujk ⎜xj1,...,xjKj,cj) = 0,    k = 1,...,Kj. (17)
Vector xjk contains the characteristics of procurements discussed in the previous section. 
Since most of these characteristics are decided by the CA, they might be influenced by un-
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observed features of the CA such as conventional practice, managerial ability, or workload. 
Suppose, for example, that busier agencies tended to overestimate the estimated cost of the 
contract so as to attract more bidders and reduce the probability that procurements be de-
clared null and void (and consequently have to either repeat the process or negotiate the 
purchase with well-known, but perhaps not very efficient, potential providers: Albano et al. 
2006). If, moreover, busier agencies tended to use PSRs of the independent type, then the 
estimate on PSR_indep would be biased in the positive direction. To control for the presence 
of unobserved factors at the CA level that were constant over the period of analysis, variable 
cj is allowed to be arbitrarily correlated with the elements of xjk.
Procurements conducted by the same CA are ordered in the data file from the oldest to 
the most recent according to the date of publication of the contract notice. Thus, the contract 
notice of procurement k = t was published no later than the contract notice of procurement 
k = s for s > t. Batches belonging to the same contracting dossier (which have the same date 
of publication) are ordered in ascending order according to their official numbering in the 
dossier: batch #1, batch #2, etc. Note that in the case of batches belonging to the same dos-
sier, potential feedback from yjt to xjs for s > t is ruled out.
The number of sample procurements managed by each CA (Kj) ranges between 1 and 
97, with an average of 10.1 (S.D. = 17.4). With 47 CAs included in the sample and  
–
Kj = 10.1, 
inference will be based on asymptotic properties of estimators assuming independence 
across CAs, but allowing for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in {ujk: k = 
1,...,Kj}. (As discussed below, the evidence suggests the {ujk: k = 1,...,Kj}  are serially uncor-
related.)
The beta parameters of model (16) are estimated with the fixed effects (FE) estimator. 
The need for fixed effects estimation was assessed using the regression-based approach to 
the Hausman (1978) test of endogeneity proposed by Wooldridge (2010, p. 332), which is 
easier to robustify to the presence of non-spherical disturbances than the original procedure 
devised by Hausman (1978). Thus, to determine if cj was correlated with xjk, the model
 ln yjk = g0 + xjk ß + 
–xjg + vjk, (18)
where
 
, was estimated by the method of ordinary least squares (OLS) with 
clustering on CA. The null hypothesis of exogeneity was tested using a Wald test of g =0. 
(Previewing the results, the test’s p-value was lower than 0.01 in all cases considered).
It is important to assess the degree of serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors. Under 
strict exogeneity, if the ujk are serially uncorrelated the FE estimator is more efficient than 
the first-difference (FD) estimator, whereas the opposite occurs whenever ujk follows a ran-
dom walk. If strict exogeneity fails but E(x’jkujk) = 0 holds and the ujk are weakly dependent, 
the FE estimator can be expected to have less inconsistency for larger Kj. Furthermore, since 
the (unobserved) non-monetary dimensions set out in the contract tend to be constant across 
contracts of the same contracting dossier, they will induce serial correlation among idiosyn-
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cratic errors of contracts belonging to the same contracting dossier. Finding that the ujk are 
serially uncorrelated would suggest that this omitted variable bias may be small.
To assess the degree of serial correlation in the ujk, we used the result that if Corr(ujt,ujs) 
= 0 for t≠s, then r≡Corr(üjt,üjs) = –1/(Kj –1) for all t≠s and r1≡ Corr(Dujt,Duj,t-1) = -0.5, where 
üjk and Dujk denote, respectively, the time-demeaned and first-differenced errors (Wooldridge 
2010, Ch. 10). To estimate r and r1, ü̂jt was regressed on ü̂j,t–1 and   D̂ujt on   D̂uj,t-1 for t ≥ 3 
using residuals pertaining to CAs who managed at least three sample procurements (see 
Wooldridge 2010, pp. 311 and 320, for details). Results suggest that the ujk are serially un-
correlated. In the full sample, r̂ = 0.06 (S.E. = 0.05) and r̂1 = –0.51 (S.E. = 0.03), whereas 
r̂ = –0.07 (S.E. = 0.12) and  r̂1 = –0.48 (S.E. = 0.06) in the subsample with n included in x. 
The FE estimator was implemented in Stata using the command xtreg ln y x, fe vce(cluster 
ID_CA), where ID_CA is the CA identifier.
5.  Results
For comparison purposes, Table 4 presents OLS estimates of equation (16). Column (1) 
contains the estimates obtained in the full sample, whereas columns (2) and (3) show, respec-
tively, the estimates obtained in the subsample first excluding and then including the quad-
ratic function of n in order to assess the impact of including in x n. The three sets of estimates 
of ß suggest that, with other factors being unchanged, the price paid for the service varies 
proportionally with the estimated cost10, increases approximately by 0.40 percent with each 
additional month of contract, is about 9 to 10 percent higher when a provisional guarantee 
must be given, is 15 to 19 percent higher for hotel/restaurant services, and diminishes with 
n and with the weight given to price in the contract award criterion (an additional bidder 
reduces the price paid by 4.32 percent on average11, while an increase of 10 percentage 
points in Wp reduces the price paid by around 3 percent). The estimate on ALTC_g3 is sta-
tistically different from zero at 10 percent, and suggests that ALTC of the type (8)-(11) re-
duce the price paid for the service by around 6 percent on average. The estimate on PSR_con-
vex is consistently positive but imprecisely measured when n in included in x. The estimates 
on PSR_indep and ALTC_g2 tend to be small and do not attain statistical significance.
The last row of Table 4 shows the p-value of the regression-based method described in 
the previous section to test whether cj and xjk are correlated. The p-value is lower than 0.01 
in the three cases shown, so that the assumption of zero correlation between cj and xjk is 
questioned. Therefore, OLS applied to equation (16) may be biased as a result of unobserved 
heterogeneity at the CA level.
The results of the FE estimation of equation (16) are presented in Table 5, whose layout 
is analogous to Table 4. The estimated coefficients on the quadratic functions of the log of 
the estimated cost and of n lie close to the OLS estimates. The implied elasticity of the price 
paid with respect to the estimated cost ranges between 1.00 and 1.02 (S.E. = 0.01 in all 
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cases), whereas, with other factors being unchanged, an additional bidder reduces the price 
paid by 4.29 percent on average (S.E. = 0.56). The estimates on Contract term and Hotel/
Restaurant become much smaller and statistically insignificant once the unobserved effect is 
eliminated by using FE. Therefore, in the OLS estimation, the main part of the additional 
price paid as indicated by these two variables reflected unobserved features of CAs that were 
constant over the period of analysis. The effect of Provisional guarantee is still positive and 
large, but it is measured less precisely.
Table 4 








Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Weight for price (÷10) -.0331*** .0083 -.0402*** .0113 -.0310*** .0114
PSR_indep -.0053 .0392 .0070 .0505 -.0330 .0484
PSR_convex .0511* .0276 .1017** .0396 .0573 .0412
ALTC_g2 .0119 .0319 -.0211 .0360 -.0300 .0317
ALTC_g3 -.0653** .0301 -.0761** .0327 -.0606* .0301
Ln of estimated cost 1.0530*** .1003 1.0969*** .0800 1.1405*** .0843
(Ln of estimated cost)2 -.0022 .0044 -.0040 .0035 -.0055 .0036
Contract term 
(months)
.0044** .0021 .0040* .0023 .0040* .0023
Urgent .0306 .0332 -.0200 .0569 -.0287 .0510
Provisional guarantee .1021** .0434 .1048** .0508 .0904** .0375
Price amend -.0161 .0346 -.0281 .0419 -.0405 .0361
Screening (weeks) -.0051 .0052 -.0035 .0042 -.0004 .0036
Maintenance of
buildings
.0723 .0534 .0490 .0503 .0940 .0583
Hotel/Restaurant .1918*** .0511 .1825*** .0527 .1499*** .0478
Other personal services .0576 .0498 .0407 .0555 .0049 .0539
Refuse .0992 .0719 .0610 .0667 .0518 .0600
Miscellaneous services .0481 .0422 .0421 .0406 .0360 .0402
Year 2013 -.0425 .0324 -.0308 .0446 -.0401 .0448
Year 2014 .0427 .0290 .0622 .0476 .0263 .0518
Year 2015 .0334 .0380 .0763* .0454 .0262 .0479
Year 2016 .0034 .0315 .0309 .0415 .0125 .0441
No. of bidders -.0517*** .0105
(No. of bidders)2 .0014*** .0004










Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
R-squared .9892 .9900 .9918
Observations 477 356 356
Wald test of g = 0 
in eq. (18)
[.0041] [.0000] [.0000]
Notes: Standard errors are clustered on contracting agency. Figures in brackets are p-values. Unreported catego-
ries: ALTC_g1, Maintenance of vehicles/apparatuses, Year 2012. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.
The estimated coefficient on Wp has decreased slightly, suggesting a -2.45 percent effect 
(S.E. = 1.41) in the subsample with n included in x. The size of this effect is substantially 
smaller than the 8 to 16 percent negative effect found by Koning and van de Meerendonk 
(2014) in a large sample of public procurements of services for reintegrating unemployed 
and disabled workers in the Netherlands. In unreported regressions, we found no evidence of 
a non-linear effect of the weight for price on ln y.
The estimates on PSR_indep remain small and statistically insignificant, although the 
estimate obtained in the subsample with n included in x hints at the possibility suggested by 
Albano, Dini, and Zampino (2009), that independent PSRs lower the price paid by inducing 
more aggressive bidding. The estimates on PSR_convex have become negative and, in the 
case presented in column (3), larger in absolute value and statistically significant at 5 per-
cent. This estimate suggests that, with other factors being unchanged, convex PSRs lower the 
price paid for the service by 8.81 percent on average (S.E. = 3.83). The direction of this effect 
concurs with Dini, Pacini, and Valletti (2006), who expected lower prices from “competitive” 
PSRs, and with Ballesteros-Pérez et al. (2016), who provide some evidence that concave 
PSRs cause a higher level of bidding conservativeness and bid concentration.
The estimates on ALTC_g2 remain small and statistically insignificant. The estimates on 
ALTC_g3 have become positive, smaller in absolute value, and statistically insignificant. 
Overall, therefore, we find no evidence that the type of ALT criterion influences the price 
paid for the service, although, admittedly, the effects are estimated somewhat imprecisely. 
Ballesteros-Pérez et al. (2016) provide some evidence that bidding aggressiveness and bid 
dispersion increase with e in a sample of 124 construction auctions whose unique generic 
mathematical expression of ALTC is given by (6).
In this and the following paragraphs, the previous findings are subjected to further scru-
tiny. Consistency of the FE estimator hinges on the strict exogeneity assumption (17). Wool-
dridge (2010, p. 325) proposes a test of strict exogeneity using fixed effects when Kj > 2, 
which consists in testing µ = 0 in the expanded equation
 ln yjk = b0 + xjk ß + wj,k+1 µ + cj + ujk,    k = 1,...,Kj –1, (19)
73Weight Values, Scoring Rules and Abnormally Low Tenders Criteria in Multidimensional Procurement...
where wj,k+1 is a subset of xj,k+1 and the test is carried out using FE estimation. Included in 
wj,k+1  are the weight for price plus the characteristics of the PSR and the ALT mechanism 
highlighted in Section 3.2, as the CA could (in principle) easily adjust these factors for future 
procurements based on shocks to yjk. The last row of Table 5 presents the p-value of this test. 
In all cases, the claim of strict exogeneity is within confidence bounds.
Table 5 








Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Weight for price (÷10) -.0203*** .0075 -.0285** .0139 -.0245* .0141
PSR_indep -.0021 .0551 -.0086 .0689 -.0539 .0529
PSR_convex -.0391 .0503 -.0566 .0531 -.0881** .0383
ALTC_g2 .0093 .0617 -.0365 .0755 -.0239 .0519
ALTC_g3 .0191 .0668 .0065 .0755 .0392 .0657
Ln of estimated cost 1.0112*** .0728 1.0857*** .0551 1.0907*** .0512
(Ln of estimated cost)2 -.0007 .0032 -.0033 .0022 -.0031 .0020
Contract term 
(months)
.0010 .0024 .0002 .0035 -.0001 .0025
Urgent .0321 .0255 .0524 .0512 .0305 .0500
Provisional guarantee .0758 .0733 .0601 .0986 .0686 .0827
Price amend -.0083 .0394 -.0008 .0590 -.0269 .0433
Screening (weeks) -.0117* .0059 -.0090 .0062 -.0047 .0038
Maintenance of 
buildings
.0376 .0620 .0511 .0778 .0356 .0450
Hotel/Restaurant .0767 .0692 .0232 .0728 .0149 .0486
Other personal services .0499 .0462 .1008 .0923 .0076 .0855
Refuse .0370 .0590 -.0213 .1109 -.0309 .0854
Miscellaneous services .0099 .0433 .0183 .0517 -.0141 .0384
Year 2013 -.0332 .0388 -.1141 .0681 -.1197** .0513
Year 2014 .0394 .0261 .0169 .0544 -.0044 .0463
Year 2015 .0273 .0387 -.0093 .0585 -.0312 .0510
Year 2016 -.0216 .0295 -.0751 .0591 -.0526 .0502
No. of bidders -.0531*** .0076
(No. of bidders)2 .0017*** .0004
Intercept -.0792 .4366 -.4633 .3435 -.4144 .3408
R-squared (within) .9727 .9699 .9747










Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Wald test of µ = 0
in eq. (19)
[.4115] [.1140] [.1238]
Notes: Standard errors are clustered on contracting agency. Figures in brackets are p-values. Unreported catego-
ries: ALTC_g1, Maintenance of vehicles/apparatuses, Year 2012. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.
Contracting agencies may have an incentive to overestimate the estimated cost to reduce 
the probability that the contract be declared null and void. But, by the “exclusion principle” 
(Albano et al. 2006), an agency pursuing the minimization of the price paid may find it in its 
interest to set a low estimated cost12. In any case, mismeasuring the general market price of 
the service introduces measurement error into the estimated cost, which will also induce 
biases on coefficients of any regressors correlated with this variable. To account for this pos-
sibility, procurements whose savings rate (calculated as the difference between the estimated 
cost and the winning bid, both inclusive of VAT, divided by the estimated cost) was above 57 
percent (the 97.5th percentile of the savings rate distribution) have been removed from the 
sample, as very high savings rates are likely to be the result of mismeasuring the general 
market price of the service. The results of re-estimating equation (16) by the FE procedure 
are presented in Table 6. The main findings of this study are preserved. (The implied elastic-
ity of the price paid with respect to the estimated cost still ranges between 1.00 and 1.02, 
S.E. = 0.01 in all cases.)
Table 6 









Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Weight for price (÷10) -.0238*** .0083 -.0290** .0131 -.0255** .0126
PSR_indep .0054 .0492 .0145 .0640 -.0265 .0455
PSR_convex -.0255 .0473 -.0486 .0548 -.0816** .0381
ALTC_g2 .0081 .0577 -.0588 .0768 -.0490 .0523
ALTC_g3 -.0007 .0607 -.0158 .0771 .0123 .0624
Ln of estimated cost .9837*** .0681 1.0585*** .0513 1.0733*** .0405
(Ln of estimated cost)2 .0008 .0027 -.0022 .0021 -.0025 .0016
Contract term 
(months)
.0010 .0019 .0001 .0031 -.0003 .0022
Urgent .0232 .0211 .0625 .0503 .0424 .0450
Provisional guarantee .0869 .0698 .0575 .0909 .0638 .0763









Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Price amend -.0114 .0446 -.0186 .0652 -.0376 .0512
Screening (weeks) -.0094** .0047 -.0071 .0050 -.0033 .0033
Maintenance of 
buildings
.0312 .0459 .0217 .0730 .0077 .0612
Hotel/Restaurant .0533 .0527 -.0161 .0596 -.0247 .0358
Other personal services .0302 .0372 .0286 .0713 -.0555 .0699
Refuse .0350 .0452 -.0775 .0832 -.0854 .0527
Miscellaneous services .0117 .0307 -.0102 .0442 -.0360 .0359
Year 2013 -.0190 .0268 -.0952 .0651 -.1020** .0496
Year 2014 .0314 .0258 .0137 .0553 -.0059 .0482
Year 2015 .0309 .0398 -.0133 .0575 -.0329 .0511
Year 2016 -.0072 .0307 -.0527 .0581 -.0344 .0500
No. of bidders -.0416*** .0087
(No. of bidders)2 .0009 .0005
Intercept .0682 .4407 -.2404 .3229 -.2671 .2849
R-squared (within) .9825 .9805 .9846
Observations 466 347 347
Notes: Standard errors are clustered on contracting agency. Unreported categories: ALTC_g1, Maintenance of 
vehicles/apparatuses, Year 2012. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
PSRs numbered 1, 6, 11, 13, 14, and 16 in column (1) of Table 2 do not assign the com-
plete price score differential because they always award a strictly positive score to the high-
est price bid. Suppose, for example, that Wp = 80%, Si = bmin/bi, b(1) = 70, and b(n)=100. Then, 
the percentage price score received by the lowest bid would be 80, and that received by the 
highest bid would be 56, so that the price score differential would be 24 percentage points 
rather than 80 percentage points as suggested by Wp. This is an example of a phenomenon 
called apparent or phony economic bid weighting by Ballesteros-Pérez et al. (2015), which 
occurs not only whenever a fraction of Si is always awarded, but also whenever a fraction of 
Si is unreachable. A practical implication of this phenomenon is that the actual weight given 
to price will be generally lower than stated in the procurement specifications (see Ballester-
os-Pérez et al. 2015), so that if bidders perceived this circumstance in advance, their incen-
tives to bid on price would be reduced.
To account for this possibility, equation (16) was re-estimated by the FE procedure with 
the weight given to price interacted with the dummy variable PSR_LPSD, which indicates 
that the PSR limits the price score differential. We would expect the coefficient on Weight 
for price*PSR_LPSD to be positive, so that an increase of 10 percentage points in Wp  would 
have a smaller effect (in absolute value) in procurements whose PSR limited the price score 
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differential. Table 7 shows the results. The estimate on Weight for price*PSR_LPSD is posi-
tive though small, so that the variable is economically and statistically insignificant. Note 
also that for these data it is difficult to disentangle the separate effects of PSR_convex and 
Weight for price*PSR_LPSD, as both variables are highly correlated (the Pearson’s product-
moment correlation coefficient equals 0.95). Therefore, when both are included in x the es-
timates become very imprecise.
Table 7 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATES OF LN OF PRICE PAID. INCLUDING WEIGHT FOR 








Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Weight for price (÷ 10) -.0239** .0118 -.0337* .0200 -.0331** .0128
Weight for price*
PSR_LPSD
.0064 .0130 .0086 .0222 .0144 .0165
PSR_indep -.0033 .0544 -.0101 .0662 -.0565 .0505
PSR_convex -.0757 .0516 -.1081 .1207 -.1742 .1079
ALTC_g2 .0114 .0599 -.0361 .0744 -.0230 .0505
ALTC_g3 .0194 .0662 .0052 .0762 .0372 .0681
Ln of estimated cost 1.0102*** .0725 1.0875*** .0554 1.0931*** .0491
(Ln of estimated cost)2 -.0007 .0032 -.0033 .0022 -.0031 .0019
Contract term 
(months)
.0012 .0025 .0004 .0035 .0003 .0025
Urgent .0329 .0256 .0523 .0515 .0304 .0508
Provisional guarantee .0787 .0755 .0579 .0984 .0650 .0813
Price amend -.0081 .0399 .0006 .0590 -.0247 .0438
Screening (weeks) -.0116* .0060 -.0090 .0062 -.0047 .0037
Maintenance of
buildings
.0389 .0610 .0519 .0778 .0364 .0448
Hotel/Restaurant .0744 .0681 .0201 .0721 .0096 .0485
Other personal
services
.0478 .0468 .0978 .0948 .0022 .0866
Refuse .0430 .0587 -.0129 .1134 -.0169 .0903
Miscellaneous services .0129 .0430 .0222 .0530 -.0080 .0404
Year 2013 -.0335 .0389 -.1150 .0684 -.1209** .0530
Year 2014 .0396 .0255 .0173 .0550 -.0035 .0467
Year 2015 .0284 .0387 -.0084 .0595 -.0295 .0519
Year 2016 -.0203 .0287 -.0738 .0594 -.0502 .0502









Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
No. of bidders -.0538*** .0078
(No. of bidders)2 .0017*** .0004
Intercept -.0599 .4349 -.4534    .3330 -.3934 .3288
R-squared (within) .9727 .9699 .9747
Observations 477 356 356
Notes: Standard errors are clustered on contracting agency. Unreported categories: ALTC_g1, Maintenance of 
vehicles/apparatuses, Year 2012. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
6.  Conclusion
Using dimensions in addition to price in supplier selection guarantees more effective-
ness when managing the trade-off between price and quality, but it adds complexity to the 
procedure. Mathematical criteria need to be included in the procurement specifications 
whenever there is need for converting a quote’s price and quality dimensions into commen-
surate scales before being combined into a total score. Many weighing functions are cur-
rently in use for evaluating bid proposals in multidimensional procurement. These may affect 
the price paid by the buyer by promoting or discouraging competition between bidders, but 
their design has been little informed by empirical considerations.
This paper contributes to filling this gap by providing econometric evidence on the ex-
tent to which properties of weighing functions such as the weight given to price, the type of 
price scoring rule, and the type of abnormally low tenders criterion, affect the price paid in 
a sample of 477 procurements of support services conducted by the Spanish Armed Forces 
in the period 2012-2016. The main limitation of this study is that the econometric model 
does not include information on the specific non-monetary dimensions set out in the contract 
nor on the contractors’ actual performance, although some evidence suggests that the conse-
quences of omitting the former may be small.
We find that using a convex price scoring rule lowers the price paid by about 9 percent, 
and that increasing the weight given to price in 10 percentage points reduces the price paid 
by approximately 2.5 percent. The latter effect is substantially smaller to that found by Kon-
ing and van de Meerendonk (2014) in a different industry, whereas the former concurs with 
Dini, Pacini, and Valletti’s (2006) insightful analysis of PSRs and provides additional sup-
port for Ballesteros-Pérez et al.’s (2016) finding that concave PSRs cause a higher level of 
bidding conservativeness and bid concentration.
On the other hand, we find little evidence of price adjustments in response to the inde-
pendent/interdependent character of the price scoring rule and to the type of abnormally low 
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tenders criterion used in the auction. The latter result may be driven by the fact that, with the 
data at hand, it is not possible to isolate the effect related to the type of ALT criterion by 
controlling for different economic thresholds across ALTC. On the other hand, all these re-
sults are not driven by contracting agencies’ unobserved heterogeneity and are robust to a 
variety of alternative specifications.
Notes
1. A WF can also combine two or more quality scores into a single overall quality score, or two or more prices 
into a single overall price (Bergman and Lundberg 2013).
2. The word tender is used in this paper as a noun meaning “the bid” or “the price bid”.
3. ALTC are commonly used mechanisms to identify unreasonably low tenders in many EU countries. Engel et 
al. (2006) discuss other methods used to mitigate the problem of risky bids.
4. Whenever the contracting dossier value was difficult to pinpoint, there was overriding urgency, or a previous 
procurement for the service had been declared void, among other circumstances, the purchase could be nego-
tiated with at least three potential providers.
5. As pointed out by Fernández Roca (2011), the purchasing of support services by the SAF spread as a conse-
quence of the reduction in the number of recruits that followed the abolition of compulsory military service 
on January 1, 2002. Coinciding with this reduction in personnel, the SAF budget for procuring commercial 
services grew from €48.6 million in 1997 to €122.9 million in 2002, and to €145.5 million in 2017 (all figures 
expressed in 2016 euros), accounting respectively for 0.61, 1.48, and 1.93 percent of the Spanish Ministry of 
Defense budget.
6. These statistics are called scoring parameters by Ballesteros-Pérez, González-Cruz, and Cañavate-Grimal 
(2012).
7. A PSR indicating the price-score reduction is smaller near bmin is called convex in Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 
(2016) but concave in this paper. The results of Ballesteros-Pérez et al. (2016) cited here have been adapted to 
the terminology used in this paper.
8. Article 85 of Spanish Royal Decree 2001/1098.
9. The fit of the regressions was much better with the estimated cost entering in log form.
10. The elasticity of the price paid with respect to the estimated cost is given by bln cost + 2bln cost2 (Ln of estimated 
cost), where bln cost and bln cost2 are the coefficients associated to Ln of estimated cost and (Ln of estimated 
cost)2, respectively. This elasticity ranges between 1.00 and 1.01 (S.E. = 0.01 in all cases) for the regressions 
shown in Table 4. Note that when the marginal effect of an explanatory variable depends on some regressor, it 
is calculated averaging across procurements.
11. The semielasticity of the price paid with respect to n is given by bbidders + 2bbidders2 (No. of bidders), where 
bbidders  and bbidders2 are the coefficients associated to No. of bidders and (No. of bidders)
2, respectively.
12. Thus, any supplier efficient enough to be able to submit an acceptable offer knows that competitors will belong 
to a pool of efficient participants, so that submitted offers will be more aggressive than in the presence of a 
higher estimated cost.
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Resumen
Muchas son las fórmulas en uso para evaluar proposiciones en adjudicaciones basadas en varios crite-
rios. Aunque estas fórmulas pueden repercutir en el precio, su diseño ha estado poco influido por 
consideraciones empíricas. Este trabajo evalúa el impacto que las ponderaciones, las funciones de 
puntuación del precio (FPP), y las normas sobre ofertas con valores anormales (NOVA) ejercen sobre 
el precio en una muestra novedosa de contratos de servicios. La riqueza y estructura de panel de los 
datos permiten mostrar que FPP convexas y una mayor ponderación del precio reducen este, mientras 
que FPP independientes/interdependientes y las NOVA lo dejan inalterado. 
Palabras clave: Adjudicaciones basadas en varios criterios, fórmulas para evaluar proposiciones, funcio-
nes de puntuación, normas sobre ofertas con valores anormales, Fuerzas Armadas españolas.
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